Virtue Ethics and Pleasure as an End

At a philosophy dissertation defense I attended today - on an excellent project bearing on sex education by Shaun Miller, which I have been following for some time (here's an interview with him on his project) - a very interesting question got put to him.

After critically examining the moral assumptions and foundations of existing sexual education curricula, Shaun advocates for an ascesis- and virtue-ethics-informed approach, general outlines of which are worked through in his nearly 500-page dissertation.

The question that got asked by one of the members of the dissertation committee had to do with Aristotelian virtue ethics and pleasure as a telos (goal, end, or purpose).  The question was asked as a challenge, and unfortunately neither the asker nor Shaun knew the relatively straightforward answer that is easily drawn out of Aristotle's own text, particularly the Nicomachean Ethics, books 3 and 4.

Here is the problem that bringing in Aristotle's virtue ethics as a basis seems to raise when it comes to sex.  When it comes to virtuous behavior, and a virtuous disposition, Aristotle thinks that pleasure is not the goal, the telos, of the behavior or disposition.  It "accompanies" or "follows upon" behaving virtuously and being virtuous.  In fact, if the person doesn't feel some sense of pleasure in being, say generous, or just, or temperate, then that person doesn't yet fully possess that virtue.  But if a person is virtuous, it's not pleasure that orients their practical reasoning, their evaluations, their choices, their actions.

This view of Aristotle's position is right, broadly speaking.  He does say things along these lines in book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics. But. . .  there are two virtues in Aristotle's listing that explicitly bear upon pleasures and pains.  In fact, he examines these in considerable detail in books 3 and 4, and his discussions there make it clear that while pleasure is not the sole end in these virtues, pleasure plays a central role in them.  It doesn't just accompany them as a side-effect.  These virtues - in Aristotle's own words - bear directly upon pleasures.

What are these two virtues?

One of them is pretty easy for anyone to guess - that is, if they've encountered or studied much Aristotelian moral theory.  It's sophrosune in Greek, often translated as "temperance," or "self-control" (though that is something a translation of enkratia), or "moderation".  This virtue has to do specifically with bodily pleasures, our indulgence in them, and our desires for them.  A temperate person will enjoy and indulge in pleasures, at the right time, to the right extent, for the right reason, and so forth.  But they will - as a central component of this virtue - focus upon pleasure.

The other is a virtue that many people skimming through the Nicomachean Ethics, or getting the typical classroom teaching treatment, won't focus on all that much - which is a real shame, since what Aristotle has to say is pretty insightful.  It's called philia, but it's typically translated as "friendliness" rather than "friendship" (which Aristotle discusses in books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics).  It too deals with pleasure - as well as pain - but not one's own.  It has to do with giving pleasure or pain to others. What it has to do with is what activities, discourses, and practices we share or don't, approve of or criticize, with others.  We give people pleasure or pain depending on what limits we lay down, observe, or enforce.

This issue of virtues and pleasures is likely worth digging into further, so once my semester is finished, I'll do so at greater length over in my Medium site.