Thumos in Platonic and Aristotelian Moral Psychology

Earlier this week, at the annual Marquette Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition conference, I gave a presentation bearing upon on one of my current research projects.  It stems from my broader research project, focused upon anger in ancient and medieval philosophy, theology, and literature.  My talk was titled "The Significance of Thumos in Platonic and Aristotelian Moral Psychology".

I didn't entirely deliver on what I'd promised in the abstract, in my own view, but my talk was very well-received by those attending.  The participants in that particular conference tend to include a lot of very well-read and competent ancient (and some medieval) scholars, so it's a nice confirmation when their verdict upon one's work is largely positive.

My presentation centered around this notion of thumos, which Plato famously makes into a third part of the soul, intermediate between the rational part and the appetitive part.  This is the part of us that gets angry, and where the virtue of courage takes its root.  It is also the part of us concerned with social status and expectations - what the Greeks tended to call "honor" - and with contention and victory as well.  In Plato, it plays a centrally important role in moral life.

In Aristotle, thumos isn't a part of the soul as such, but rather a mode of the emotional, affective, or desirous, non-rational part which Aristotle calls orexis.  He still does give it and its associated objects significance in his own moral psychology.

In my presentation, I examined Plato's and Aristotle's treatments of thumos in some detail, and then went on to discuss Hellenistic perspectives of two sorts.  The first sort includes the Epicureans, Stoics, and Cicero.  None of these view thumos as having a positive role, and tend to reduce it to just one kind of anger.  The second sort includes a host of later Platonic, Aristotelian, and eclectic thinkers who for the most part do view thumos more positively, and who also bring back something like a Platonic tripartition of the soul.  I finished up by briefly discussing a few early Christian thinkers who also continue along these lines, but frame thumos' function in an explicitly Christian perspective.

I did manage to make a decent enough audio-recording of the session, which you can listen to.




I plan to write a series of posts here going deeper into some of the thinkers and schools, and their treatments of thumos, over the next few months.